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Reforming the European Parliament 
Brexit Creates Opportunity for More than Just Seat Redistribution – But Plans 
Are Modest (for Now) 
Nicolai von Ondarza and Felix Schenuit 
Reform of the European Parliament is on the agenda in the run-up to the 2019 Euro-
pean elections. Two impulses coincide here: First of all, Brexit requires a decision on 
whether to redistribute the 73 British seats, and if so how. Secondly, the European 
Parliament is sitting on a backlog of long-overdue reforms relating to its composition; 
this latter aspect is unlikely to be resolved before the 2019 elections. The Italian and 
French governments suggest creating a single EU constituency fought on the basis of 
transnational lists, to strengthen the European plane of party-political competition. 
But the European Parliament’s rejection of the proposal underlines the lack of majority 
support for federal initiatives in the EU’s year of reforms. Yet the single constituency 
discussion does offer potential: Leveraging it to reduce the existing discrepancies in 
required votes per seat would represent a major contribution to strengthening the 
Union’s democratic legitimacy. 
 
The European Parliament (EP) plays a para-
doxical role in the debate over the EU’s 
democratic deficits. On the one hand it 
serves as the EU’s sole directly elected organ 
and as such as a vehicle for further democ-
ratisation. Every treaty amendment to date 
has therefore expanded the EP’s powers. 
The share of EU legislation adopted with 
the Parliament’s full participation has now 
reached almost 50 percent. One sign of Par-
liament’s growing assertiveness is its deci-
sion to use its new powers to elect the Com-
mission President in 2014 (the so-called 
“Spitzenkandidaten” principle). 
But on the other hand the EP itself is also 
implicated in the EU’s democratic deficits. 
Almost 40 years after the first direct elec-
tions, the European Parliament is still 
selected via a set of parallel national ballots 
whose European legitimacy remains scant: 
voters choose among their respective 
national parties. While the parties do then 
join to form pan-European political groups 
in the EP, these lack any autonomous rela-
tionship to the public. Despite the intro-
duction of the Spitzenkandidaten principle, 
turnout at European elections has con-
tinued to fall – to just 42.6 percent in 2014. 
The question of reform of the European 
Parliament is therefore a persistent feature 
of the EU’s institutional reform debate. 
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Impulses for EP Reform 
A political window of opportunity for such 
reforms opens up in 2018. On the one hand, 
Brexit will leave the 73 British seats avail-
able for redistribution. On the other, there 
is growing pressure to break the logjam 
and institute comprehensive reforms, after 
years of provisional arrangements. 
73 Empty Seats 
First and foremost, Brexit will force a deci-
sion on the distribution of seats in the EP. 
After triggering Article 50 TEU on 29 March 
2017 the United Kingdom is expected to 
leave the European Union exactly two years 
later. So barring unforeseen surprises, the 
British will quit the Union’s political insti-
tutions roughly one month before the next 
European elections in May 2019 (see SWP 
Comment 54/2017). Until that point the 
British MEPs remain full members of the EP; 
when the UK leaves their seats fall vacant. 
Three different scenarios are under discus-
sion for dealing with the 73 empty seats 
within the scope of the existing treaties. 
Firstly, the seats could simply be re-
moved, reducing the size of the Parliament 
from 751 MEPs to 678. One of the argu-
ments put forward by advocates of this ap-
proach is that the EP, whose size is capped 
at 751 by the Lisbon Treaty, is already one 
of Europe’s largest parliaments; Brexit 
offers the EU an opportunity to make 
visible economies. By way of comparison, 
the EP is almost twice the size of the Span-
ish Congress of Deputies, but the same 
order of magnitude as the current German 
Bundestag, which has 709 seats. Notably, 
the 794-member British House of Lords is 
larger than the European Parliament. This 
route would also obviate the politically 
delicate process of renegotiating the allo-
cation of seats to countries. 
The second option would be to use some 
or all of the 73 seats to reduce the existing 
inequalities of representation between the 
27 member states. The current seat distri-
bution is based not on a mathematical for-
mula, but was politically negotiated – most 
recently in 2013 after the accession of Croa-
tia. The principle of degressive proportion-
ality seeks to reconcile two objectives: fair 
representation of citizens and minimum 
representation of smaller member states. 
Under this arrangement each member state 
has at least six MEPs (with the minimum 
applying to Cyprus, Estonia, Malta and 
Luxembourg). The number of MEPs grows 
with the country’s population, but not en-
tirely proportionally; while a Luxembourg 
MEP represents about 80,000 inhabitants, 
their German counterpart is responsible for 
more than 800,000. 
This principle is anchored in the treaties 
and – despite misgivings over the inequali-
ties it produces – is not up for discussion. 
Within the system, however, there are also 
specific issues that affect particular states. 
For example Italy is more populous than 
Spain but has fewer voters per MEP. The 73 
empty seats could potentially be used to 
iron out such discrepancies. Germany’s rep-
resentation cannot be increased without a 
treaty amendment, as its 96 MEPs represent 
the ceiling stipulated in the Lisbon Treaty. 
The third and most radical proposal goes 
further than simply redistributing seats to 
member states: The creation of a separate 
single European constituency to elect MEPs 
on transnational lists would enable the 
European parties to compete directly for 
seats in the European Parliament. And Brexit 
offers the opportunity to create such a Euro-
pean single constituency without any mem-
ber state having to “relinquish” seats. In 
recent discussions the Italian government, 
French President Emmanuel Macron and 
Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker 
have argued for such transnational lists. 
Parliament’s Backlog of Reforms 
A second set of impulses for reform emerge 
from the EP’s internal dynamics. The com-
position of the EP and the procedures for its 
elections are laid out in the 1976 Act Con-
cerning the Election of the Members of the 
European Parliament by Direct Universal 
Suffrage, which was last amended in 2002. 
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Demands to overhaul the EP’s composition 
have been growing for some time. In 2009, 
with its position strengthened by the Treaty 
of Lisbon, the EP sought to apply that mo-
mentum to initiate a reform of the electoral 
system. The Constitutional Affairs Commit-
tee appointed Andrew Duff (ALDE) as rap-
porteur, but it took the parliament until 
2013 to agree on reform proposals. Earlier 
versions of the report contained far-reaching 
ideas, including the introduction of a 
twenty-five-member single EU constituency, 
but failed to find a majority in the EP. 
The 2014 European elections forced Par-
liament’s hand, and a provisional arrange-
ment was cobbled together. In the discus-
sion the EP threw its support behind the 
Spitzenkandidaten principle, which was 
later codified at its instigation. But the pro-
posal no longer mentioned the idea of a 
single EU constituency. At the same time 
the EP’s report committed it to finding a 
“permanent and transparent” solution for 
2019 and propose it to the Council (whose 
approval is required). 
The resulting proposal was adopted in 
plenary session on 11 November 2015, by a 
comparatively narrow majority of 52 per-
cent. It calls for the European character of 
EP elections to be strengthened through 
measures including naming the European 
parties on the ballot papers and harmonis-
ing national election rules. The European 
Parliament also called for the creation of a 
single EU constituency to be fought by the 
lead candidates. 
Since then the EP’s proposal been stuck 
in Council, without any decision being 
taken to date. The British, Dutch, French, 
Luxembourgish and Swedish parliaments, 
for example, criticised the proposal’s vio-
lation of the subsidiarity principle, object-
ing in particular to the requirement for 
voting to be run to a particular timeframe. 
Now, after the Council’s failure to approve 
its proposal, the European Parliament again 
finds itself seeking a provisional solution to 
ensure that orderly elections can be held in 
2019 – and in particular an arrangement 
for the 73 vacant British seats. Fundamen-
tal reform and a permanent solution have 
been pushed back to the subsequent elec-
tion in 2024. 
In February 2018 the Parliament adopted 
a proposal for a temporary solution that 
combines the aforementioned versions 2 
and 3: for 2019 the EP will be reduced pro-
visionally to 705 members, using 27 of the 
British seats to balance out discrepancies 
(see graphic, p. 4). The other 46 seats would 
be kept free for possible enlargements or for 
a single EU constituency in future elections. 
Is a Single EU Constituency 
the Answer? 
An explicit call to introduce a single Euro-
pean constituency for the 2019 election 
failed to find a majority in the EP’s plenary 
session in February 2018. But even if Par-
liament had approved the idea, it is more 
than questionable whether the single con-
stituency would actually have been realised 
for 2019 – given that the fundamental deci-
sion about what is done with the British 
seats and the introduction of transnational 
lists must be taken unanimously in the 
European Council, where opinions are 
similarly divided. Recently the EuroMed 7 
states and Ireland expressed their support 
for France and Italy’s transnational lists 
proposal, while the Visegrád states (Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) for 
instance voiced public opposition. 
Upon closer examination, moreover, it 
becomes apparent how many questions 
remain unresolved and how much political 
will would be required to realise the Euro-
pean single constituency – especially in 
time for the 2019 elections. In general 
terms, four aspects need to be considered 
when assessing the initiative: the under-
lying objectives of the reforms, their con-
crete shape and form, the associated legis-
lative requirements, and the political ob-
stacles that need to be overcome. 
The declared goal of the supporters of 
a single EU constituency is to enhance 
the democratic legitimacy of the Union by 
strengthening the pan-European character 
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of its elections. If European parties with 
transnational lists compete directly for 
seats, the argument runs, they would sig-
nificantly improve their electoral visibility 
– even if the number of seats involved re-
mained small. It would also force the Euro-
pean parties to select their own candidates 
for the first time and in the process agree 
at least on the fundamental thrust of their 
respective campaigns. In combination with 
the – still controversial – Spitzenkandida-
ten principle, it is argued, this would 
rescue the European elections from their 
current “second class” status. 
Critics of the single EU constituency 
respond that such a reform could in fact 
actually weaken the EU’s democratic legiti-
macy. On the one hand, they fear that it 
could produce two classes of MEP, on the 
other that the connection between MEPs 
and their constituents could become even 
weaker than is already the case, especially 
in the larger member states. On those points 
the advocates of reform reply that all MEPs 
would continue to enjoy the same rights 
and obligations, and that each of them 
would represent all EU citizens. The pro-
reform side also rejects concerns that the 
existence of two parallel arrangements 
could generate tensions within Parliament, 
pointing out that national elections in Ger-
many and Hungary for example also use 
mixed-member proportional representa-
tion. 
Requirements for a Single EU 
Constituency with Transnational Lists 
A range of different models have been put 
forward for the concrete shape of such a 
single constituency. The first question is 
its size, often discussed in terms of the pro-
posal for a transnational list with 25 MEPs 
repeatedly put forward by Andrew Duff 
since 2011. A second – rather unlikely – 
option would be for all 73 vacated British 
seats to be filled by way of a transnational 
list. The most far-reaching proposal to date 
comes from French President Emmanuel 
Macron: to have about half of MEPs elected 
via the single EU constituency as of the 
2024 elections. But that would call into 
question the entire system by which EP 
seats are distributed. The option with the 
best medium-term political prospects of 
realisation would be for a portion of the 
 
Reallocation of 27 seats 
Country Current seats Additional seats 
France  74 +5 
Spain  54 +5 
Italy  73 +3 
Netherlands  26 +3 
Ireland  11 +2 
Poland  51 +1 
Romania  32 +1 
Sweden  20 +1 
Austria  18 +1 
Finland  13 +1 
Slovakia  13 +1 
Denmark  13 +1 
Croatia  11 +1 
Estonia  6 +1 
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vacated British seats – say 30 to 50 – to be 
used for a single EU constituency. 
Next, it would be necessary to clarify the 
voting system. The introduction of a single 
EU constituency presupposes that each 
European party would create its own list 
and compete for party list votes across all 
the member states. France has also pro-
posed a rule – analogous to the rules for 
forming a group in the EP – that the first 
seven places on the list must include can-
didates from seven different countries. This 
would prevent a situation arising where a 
handful of large member states dominate 
the supposedly “transnational” lists. 
Even the supporters of a single EU 
constituency disagree among themselves 
whether the reform should be formally tied 
to the Spitzenkandidaten principle. Some 
are clear that the respective lead candidates 
should also head their party’s transnational 
list to ensure that they are directly elected – 
unlike for example Jean-Claude Juncker in 
2014. Independently of this, the European 
parties would have to create internal mecha-
nisms for nominating the candidates for 
their transnational lists – which would con-
siderably expand their influence over the 
EP’s membership as this is presently the 
prerogative of the national parties. Imme-
diately after the EP’s rejection of the single 
EU constituency, leading MEPs emphasised 
that the decision in no way affected the 
Spitzenkandidaten process introduced 
in 2014, which the EP was determined to 
retain. 
A Means to Improve Representation 
While a single EU constituency could con-
tribute to bringing forth real party-politi-
cal competition at the European level, 
this would do little to resolve the issues of 
unequal representation. But the introduc-
tion of a second list vote for the European 
elections could also be used to correct some 
of the distortions created by the system of 
degressive proportionality. In political terms 
these are not insignificant. In the 2014 elec-
tion the parties of the social democratic 
S&D group (with 26.74 percent) came in 
fractionally ahead of the conservative EPP 
(26.67 percent) but the EPP was stronger 
in the smaller member states – and thus 
received more MEPs relative to vote share. 
The upshot of the fragmented voting sys-
tem was that the EPP received 28.8 percent 
of the seats, the S&D only 25.3 percent (see 
Table, p. 6). 
This discrepancy had far-reaching con-
sequences, because the Spitzenkandidaten 
principle requires the Commission Presi-
dent to be chosen in light of the outcome 
of the European elections. As the largest 
group, the EPP claimed the post for its 
lead candidate Jean-Claude Juncker – even 
though the formulation in the EU Treaty is 
vague enough that the S&D could also have 
insisted on their candidate Martin Schulz 
on the basis of winning the largest share 
of the absolute vote. But with the EP at the 
time wanting most of all to defend the Spit-
zenkandidaten principle against the national 
governments in the European Council, the 
mainstream groups quickly united behind 
Juncker and the EPP. The transnational lists 
could be used to allocate adjustment seats 
in line with the Europe-wide distribution 
of list votes and thus even out discrepancies 
created by degressive proportionality. This 
would do a great deal to boost fairness of 
representation in the European Parliament 
and thus the democratic legitimacy of the 
EU. After the EP’s rejection of the single EU 
constituency this could be an argument for 
keeping the idea alive until 2024. 
The Need for Further Harmonisation of 
European Election Voting Rules 
One decisive obstacle to the creation of a 
single EU constituency is that the legis-
lation for European elections would have 
to be harmonised across the member states. 
In technical terms European Parliament 
elections are still a collection of national 
ballots where certain important aspects are 
stipulated (for example dates, proportional 
representation), but significant details dif-
fer. For example there is neither a uniform 
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Table 
European election 2014:  
Vote share and seats gained 
Group Vote 
share 
Seats 
(ideal) 
Seats 
(actual) 
Difference 
(actual-
ideal) 
GUE/NGL  8.26%  62  52 –10 
G/EFA  7.67%  58  50  –8 
S&D  26.74%  201  191 –10 
ALDE  8.83%  66  67  1 
EPP  26.67%  200  221  21 
ECR  7.89%  59  70  11 
EFDD  7.29%  55  48  –7 
Non-
attached 
 6.63%  50  52  2 
Source: http://www.foederalist.eu/2014/10/warum-
die-sozialdemokraten-bei-der.html. 
voting age nor a shared deadline for voter 
registration. Nor are national parties or 
their candidates required to identify with a 
European party. Misgivings over excessive 
harmonisation have often led to rejection 
of EP reforms, which is good reason to 
devote greater attention to this factor. 
The EP’s report of 2015 already called for 
a far-reaching harmonisation of national 
legislation for European elections. But a 
string of its demands collide with national 
voting traditions, leading the member states 
to reject the proposals in the Council. In 
view of this blockade it is necessary in par-
ticular to clarify which aspects of electoral 
law must absolutely be harmonised for an 
EU-wide constituency to be created, and 
which can be left alone in deference to na-
tional preferences. For example, although 
it would be helpful in terms of generating 
political enthusiasm to hold the European 
elections on a single day across the Union, 
member states have different traditional 
voting days that are unwilling to concede. 
There are three aspects where realisation 
of a single EU constituency leaves no alter-
native to harmonisation of the rules for 
European elections. Firstly, the introduc-
tion of transnational lists presupposes 
stronger involvement of the European par-
ties in European elections. The situation at 
present is that national parties standing in 
European elections may join together in and 
beyond the EP, but their European political 
affiliations play little or no role in the cam-
paign. Because the transnational lists would 
represent the European parties, there 
would need to be some kind of link to show 
which national parties they are associated 
with. Clarity over the connection between 
second list vote and European party would 
be especially relevant if the transnational 
lists – as proposed above – were used for 
adjustment seats. 
Secondly there is currently no uniform 
deadline by which candidates for European 
elections need to be registered. The national 
deadlines range from three months (Swe-
den) to less than three weeks (Greece, Spain). 
For transnational lists to function, there 
would need to be a single deadline for 
candidate registration. 
Thirdly – especially from the German 
perspective – the question of a uniform 
threshold for the European elections arises. 
As the German Federal Constitutional 
Court ruled in 2014, Germany’s 3 percent 
threshold is unconstitutional in European 
elections unless it applies across all mem-
ber states. Since then the German govern-
ment has been pressing for an obligatory 
minimum threshold of 3 percent for all EU 
states, to be introduced for the next Euro-
pean elections. But this is hardly a pressing 
question for most other states, as they 
either have their own national threshold or 
the number of MEPs they elect is so small 
that it would be impossible for one to be 
elected with less than 3 percent of the vote 
anyway. In fact, such a clause would be 
relevant only for Spain and Germany. The 
introduction of a transnational list would 
require a decision on whether a Europe-
wide threshold is required, and if so at 
what level it should be set. 
Legal and Political Challenges 
In theory the introduction of a single Euro-
pean constituency would be possible with-
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out risking the vagaries of an EU treaty 
amendment, because the EU Treaty defines 
the minimum and maximum size of na-
tional constituencies but does not tie these 
explicitly to the nationality of the candi-
dates. Proponents of a single European con-
stituency therefore argue that the candi-
dates on the transnational lists would stand 
not as citizens of a member state but as EU 
citizens. Already a German can for example 
win a seat in France without this affecting 
the upper limit of 96 “German” MEPs. 
Nevertheless, four central and closely 
interconnected hurdles remain. Firstly a 
reform of the EP involves many veto players 
– even for the EU – who could block the 
project or demand concessions. For example 
Article 223 TFEU grants the European Par-
liament the right to propose arrangements 
for elections to select its members. How 
closely contested the majorities can be was 
seen in the February 2018 vote on the single 
EU constituency, where the outcome 
remained unclear until the vote was held. 
And then the Parliament’s proposal must 
not only be adopted unanimously by the 
Council but also ratified by the member 
states in accord with their respective consti-
tutions. In Germany for example the Bun-
destag must approve. And the respective 
national election laws would need to be 
amended. 
Secondly there is the time factor. In order 
to conduct orderly European elections, the 
European and national prerequisites need 
to be clarified no later than the beginning 
of 2019, for reasons including deadlines for 
candidate registration. Thirdly, fundamen-
tal differences between member states and 
between political currents over the ques-
tion of where the EU should be heading 
also affect the question of EP reform. This is 
because creating a single EU constituency, 
the associated strengthening of the Euro-
pean electoral dimension, and the at least 
implicit linkage of the reform to the Spit-
zenkandidaten principle all represent a 
brand of federalism that is rejected by cer-
tain member states, such as Hungary and 
Poland. 
The processes within the European par-
ties represent a fourth challenge. Trans-
national lists would expose the differences 
between the national constituent parties 
a great deal more starkly than already oc-
curred in the process of selecting lead can-
didates for the 2014 election. For example 
the German CDU and Hungary’s FIDESZ 
would have to agree on a transnational list 
with at least a rudimentary joint manifesto. 
Outlook 
The current impulses for reforming the 
European Parliament open up a new per-
spective in the complex debate about the 
EU’s democratic deficits. As the analysis 
shows, a single European constituency 
could contribute to making European elec-
tions more European and creating party-
political competition at the European level. 
But it would not be a panacea. In particular 
the discrepancies in representation in the 
EP can only be reduced if the transnational 
lists are used to allocate adjustment seats – 
which would require a complex and finely 
tuned system. 
The biggest challenge for reform of the 
EP is the combination of time pressure, 
legal complexity and political conflict. A 
treaty amendment might not be needed, 
but such a reform would still require un-
animity in the Council, approval by the EP 
and amendment of electoral legislation in 
all 27 member states. 
After the Council blocked the EP’s 2015 
proposal and Parliament in February 2018 
again resorted to a provisional solution, it 
is clear that there is currently no majority 
for federal proposals in the European insti-
tutions. Trumpeted as the year of reform, 
2018 in fact begins with agreement on the 
lowest common denominator. Significant 
innovations in the EP are unlikely, with a 
proper breakthrough on parliamentary 
reforms put back until 2024. 
The minimum goal for the coming nego-
tiations between the EU institutions over 
redistribution of the British seats should 
therefore be to ensure that leeway remains 
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to introduce a single EU constituency at a 
later stage. The provisional solution adopted 
for 2019 should avoid creating further new 
path-dependencies. 
Especially Germany, which is especially 
affected by inequality of representation, 
must possess an interest in pressing ahead 
with longer-term reforms. After the Euro-
pean Parliament blocked the path to intro-
ducing a single EU constituency for the 
2019 elections, the ball is now in the mem-
ber states’ court. What is needed most of 
all is an understanding about how the 2019 
European elections can be organised in 
such a way as to strengthen the democratic 
legitimacy of the EU. That means abiding 
by the Spitzenkandidaten principle. 
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